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The Middle East 1938-1942 211 starts afresh
Close inspection shows the leading three aircraft all bear the AO code. The second aircraft of the ten in this shot is AO-K. Dated Oct 38 on the rear. By the Spring of 1939 they had re-equipped with the Bristol Blenheim Mk I.
L1488 leading, LJ code in use. Middle East movements 211 Squadron’s establishment (their Initial Equipment or IE) was officially 12 aircraft. Of these, nine aircraft were expected to be fully serviceable at any one time. That is, nine aircraft (three flights of three) with their 27 aircrew was “maximum effort” – a full Squadron operation. In March 1940, the Squadron was made up to its war establishment, increasing the personnel strength of the Squadron to 361 officers and airmen. Aptly, the Squadron badge included the motto Toujours à propos (“always at the right moment”). With pride in their reputation for speedy deployment (and likewise aptly), they called themselves "The Greyhounds" and their various little bars “The Greyhound Inn” and the like.
Helwan was the site of a major RAF station in Egypt well before the war, on the edge of the eastern desert 15 miles (25 km) south of Cairo, both Nile and railway close at hand. The size of the encampment is readily seen. On the apron outside the vast main hangar are 6 Vickers Wellesleys, most probably of 45 Squadron. No dispersals but signs of a heightened state of readiness, with a number of slit trenches in evidence. Taken together, these suggest a date between the Munich crisis of October 1938 and June 1939, when 45 Squadron re-equipped with Blenheims. Italian adventures in Africa and Greece Italy’s belated declaration of war against France in June 1940 also brought the war to North Africa. The period June to September saw the Italians mount air attacks and a successful advance into Egypt from Libya. With confidence high after this African adventure, Mussolini made Greece an ultimatum on 28 October 1940. To the surprise of the Italians, the Greeks declined to surrender, strongly resisting the invasion that followed immediately through Albania. In North Africa, the Italian advance from Libya into Egypt had halted around Sidi Barrani in mid-September 1940. With considerable secrecy Wavell was in the process of building his forces for a response, the first of many see-saws across the Western Desert. Then the Italians struck at Greece. 1939 treaty obligations aside, the British government was quite determined to support the Greeks. Contemporary documents are guarded in their discussion of underlying strategic issues but it has become clear in recent years that, through Ultra intelligence, there was considerable awareness in London and in Cairo of the timing and weight of Italian preparations in Africa and Albania, and of German intentions in Eastern Europe. Mindful that the presence of British troops might provoke a German response, the Greeks called for air support only and declined other aid. At this stage of the war, the slender British Middle East forces were the only practical source for any such adventure, be it naval, ground or air. RAF Middle East and British Air Forces Greece Before the Italians struck, it had been Longmore who resisted all blandishments to divert aircraft to Greece. Now, aware of Wavell's pending December offensive in Egypt and against considerable barracking from the British ambassador to Greece, it was Anthony Eden in Cairo who counselled against further commitment. The Foreign Secretary pressed his case to Churchill by signal and by offering to return to London to amplify his position. As an increasingly testy Prime Minister signalled him “Do not return”, the CAS signalled Longmore to provide the greatest possible material support to Greece. Despite a possible fresh Italian advance into Egypt (and the pressing priority of air support for Wavell's planned counter-attack), Longmore took no half-measures. Recognising at the outset that the only possible contribution would be a token force at high risk of loss, Longmore sought the best chance of survival for his airmen by digging as deep as his short pockets would allow. Of the existing 16 Middle East squadrons, no less than one-quarter was detached forthwith to form British Air Forces Greece (BAFG). The force so formed represented near half the available fighter and bomber strength of the Command. Thus by the end of November, 30 Squadron had been joined by three more squadrons: 211 and 84 (with Blenheim Is) and 80 (Gloster Gladiators, re-equipped with Hawker Hurricanes in late February). With this small force, AVM D'Albiac immediately set about providing strategic air support to the Greek counter-offensive. Through November and December, the Greeks rapidly drove the invading Italian forces from North-Western Greece and back into Albania. Despite poor winter weather and even poorer road and transport conditions, they stoutly resisted fresh Italian advances from early January. By late February, however, the military situation was such that the Greek government agreed to accept further air support and land forces as well. In an early December visit, 112 Squadron had handed its Gladiators to the Royal Hellenic Air Force. By March, BAFG had been reinforced with the return of 112 Squadron (with Hurricanes and Gladiators) and the arrival of 113 and 11 Squadrons (Blenheim IVs) and 33 Squadron (Hurricanes). From Egypt, Vickers Wellingtons of 37 and 70 Squadrons operated mainly at night against Italian ports. BAFG had been formed on an undertaking of urgent re-supply of RAF Middle East from the UK. The further reinforcement of BAFG contemplated in Athens, Cairo and London could only then be achieved by the demanding convoy and air-ferry route through Takoradi on the West African Gold Coast and on to Egypt. The difficulties of this feat, first by convoy through hostile waters, followed by aircraft assembly at Takoradi, and then by air across 2,000 miles of desert, were not fully appreciated in London. Heated exchanges arose between Churchill and Longmore about the serviceable strength of ME Cmd as against (crated) aircraft sent from the UK. By 1942, the Takoradi route was indeed delivering splendid results but in 1941 the re-supply task was still truly formidable. While accounts of the order of battle differ within the various official records, as do accounts of losses, at its greatest strength BAFG comprised 10 operational RAF squadrons (2 of which were reconnaissance units), two FAA units and a number of other detachments, never reaching it's mooted 14 Squadron total. 211 goes to Greece
A small fin flash, and no obvious aircraft codes (though such details were sometimes censored) Whatever the Greek Government's views on close support, it initially had the greatest reluctance to provide suitable forward all-weather landing grounds, again for fear of provoking a German response. Accordingly, 211 was posted initially to Tatoi (Menidi) near Athens. From there, it was a long and difficult flight in filthy winter weather to attack the Italian rear, deep in Albania. Typically, just one day after the air party's arrival at Menidi the Greyhounds mounted their first raid of the Greek campaign: a full squadron operation against Durazzo, on the coast of Albania some 350 miles from Athens. As BAFG reinforcements arrived, D'Albiac was able to offer closer support to the delight of the Greeks. The Squadron moved forward to Paramythia (literally, valley of legends) in NW Greece, with 80 Squadron at Yannina in support. When things hotted up in the early Spring 211 withdrew temporarily to Menidi, but were back at Paramythia by the last week of March 1941.
Again, the small flash and no visible codes. By early Spring (25 March), the Italian's reverses saw the Germans enter the campaign, first invading Yugoslavia and then, in overwhelming force from the North and North-East, Greece. British and Australian troops had barely arrived. The RAF as BAFG had at that date eight Squadrons of around 80 serviceable aircraft, facing about 160 Italian and perhaps 800 Luftwaffe (Luftflotte 4) aircraft. On Easter Sunday, 14 April 1941, 211 sent two flights (six of it's remaining seven serviceable aircraft) against elements of Stumme's 40 Motorised Corps, streaming through the Monastir Gap. For this raid, no fighter escort was available. All six aircraft were lost. See CFR Clark: Operations in Greece. Just two of the 18 aircrew survived, only to be shot down in another incident shortly after: thus only one of the 211 members who took part survived the raid. Two of the aircrew lost were not in fact 211 personnel, but were “having a look”—Wing Commander Coote and Squadron Leader Cryer, the OC Western Wing and his deputy. In 1993, the remains of one of the six lost Blenheims (Buchanan and co’s L1434) were recovered from Lake Prespa by a combined HAF/Army team. The story was briefly told in Aeroplane Monthly (October 1993) and at length in Blenheim Over the Balkans. The last 211 Squadron operations in Greece were of individual aircraft on the night of 19/20 April 1941. The Squadron was then almost immediately withdrawn, with their remaining aircraft in varying states of serviceability or by flying boat, through Crete to Egypt.
Probably taken with a box Brownie by a crew member or passenger on one of the evacuation flights from Greece. Flying at about 100ft altitude and possibly on the same trip, given the uniformly flat hazy light. The same aircraft, going on the identically incomplete camouflage. Applied only to the waterline, the aim was to make the unarmed civil flying boats look like the 230 Squadron Sunderlands that often—but not always—flew close escort with them on the long hostile waters flight to Egypt. Overnighting at Suda Bay in Crete, Coorong and Cambria made 13 return trips with 469 service personnel evacuated from Greece between 22 April and 5 May 1941, in addition to the efforts of 230 Squadron. Jim Fryatt was evacuated aboard Cambria. The story of these flights is recounted in Phil Sims’ Adventurous Empires, and in Brian Cassidy’s Flying Empires. The RAF Narrative of the Greek campaign records that the four Blenheim bomber squadrons between them lost 91 aircraft, of which 61 were lost in battle. Total BAFG aircrew casualties were 148 killed and missing plus a further 15 prisoners of war. Of these 163 personnel, 150 were aircrew. Palestine 211 as 72 OTU
S/Ldr McDonald was unimpressed with Wadi Gazouza as a site for a major training operation. Once 72 OTU was formally established and up to strength (around 1,000 airmen), they quickly moved to Kenya. On 19 December 1941, under 72 OTU Movement Order No 2/1941, the ground personnel of 211 Squadron were ordered to depart Wadi Gazouza the following day, Saturday 20 December 1941. In the Middle East, the RAF was preparing as rapidly as possible to reinforce the Far East theatre. The Japanese had entered the war just two weeks earlier, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse had already been sunk in the Gulf Of Siam and the Imperial Japanese Army was advancing down the Malay peninsula upon Singapore. The formation of 72 OTU and its close relationship and overlap with 211 Squadron is recorded in the narrative beginnings of their Operational Record Book (TNA AIR 29/686). There, too, is to be found the Movement Order and its nominal roll of the ground party moving to re-form 211 Squadron, 293 officers and men, ordered to make their way by road, rail and Nile steamer to Helwan and work up to operational readiness. The corresponding order and roll for the Squadron's air party has not yet come to light. 211 Losses 1940-1941
In their first year of action, over 40 aircrew were lost in 15 aircraft from a Squadron establishment of 12 aircraft. Poor survival odds. The loss of 11 aircraft in Greece in two very short periods were blows that cannot adequately be described by anyone who was not there. “A very shaky do!”. Worse was to come. While stood down to work up the 72 OTU operation at Wadi Gazouza, the Squadron suffered the loss of Sgt JJ “Paddy” Kavanagh (veteran of the Desert, Palestine and Greece) to natural causes; and of the all-Australian crew of Sgts Skinner, Dunstone and Thompson in a training accident.
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